“Iran’s strategy is defensive. Iran is not seeking war — but that does not mean that in implementing its strategy, particularly when it comes to self-defense, it will necessarily confine itself to defensive tactics alone.” This is a position that, in recent months, has been reiterated in various ways by the country’s military and defense officials.
The position underscores that the Islamic Republic of Iran is not war-mongering and does not seek war. History shows that, at least to this point, it has never not been the initiator of any conflict. Yet this does not mean that, at the tactical level, it will restrict itself exclusively to defensive measures in safeguarding its security, nor that it will structure its plans, maneuvers, operations and strikes solely within the confines of defensive tactics.
At the tactical level, offensive designs will certainly form part of Iran’s broader military and defense doctrine — a comprehensive offensive that, in terms of scale, quality, and target bank, is incomparable to what unfolded during the 12-Day War against the Zionist enemy.
During the 12-Day War, the enemy — though able to inflict cost on Iran in its first half through an element of surprise — soon faced a different reality. The war rooms in Tel Aviv and Washington know better than anyone that once the initial shock subsided, the second half of the conflict decisively belonged to Iran. Iran’s retaliatory strikes grew more sophisticated and more lethal as the war progressed.
It was this trajectory that ultimately pushed the enemy to a ceasefire. The true nature of the 12-Day War is not found in the bombast of the Zionist regime’s prime minister, but in the appeals made by the regime’s own military commanders.
Three days into the war, having observed clear signs that Iran had regained its footing and repelled the initial surprise strike, they advised the prime minister in a closed-door meeting to de-escalate — a recommendation the expansionist Zionist prime minister rejected. Yet the escalating intensity of Iran’s strikes during the War’s second half eventually drove him to a ceasefire.
Drawing from the experience of that second phase, and the lessons it holds for today, several points are worth highlighting.
First, in that confrontation, Iran was caught off guard only at the zero hour of hostilities. That factor no longer exists. If, during the 12-Day War, there was a 12-hour gap between the enemy’s aggression and Iran’s response, in any future confrontation the zero hour of Iran’s offensive operations will come in less than 12 minutes.
Second, Iran’s offensive capability at that time represented only a fraction of the armed forces’ total potential. During that war, the Aerospace Force, the Air Force, and Air Defense units stood at the frontlines of the confrontation. That situation is not comparable to Iran’s current standing. Should any spark be ignited against Iran, the armed forces’ and security forces’ offensive programs will no longer be confined to those three conventional branches; offensive responses will be activated across all levels of Iran’s military and security apparatus.
Third, unlike the 12-Day War, when the primary target banks for Iran’s military lay 1,200 to 1,600 kilometers away, in any potential future confrontation, in addition to the Zionist target banks, there are also high-value targets at much closer ranges. This reduced distance will alter both the scale and the quality of Iran’s offensive responses. Iran is prepared for a comprehensive, full-spectrum offensive scenario — one whose operations will not be confined to the skies, but will also leverage other domains against enemy interests. These capabilities, long kept dormant and reserved for the day of contingency, are not meant to remain in that state forever.
Finally, the Islamic Republic of Iran has always upheld the principle of security rooted in an indigenous regional framework. To put it simply and clearly: security in the region is either for everyone, or for no one. If Iran’s national security is violated, then that principle no longer holds ground. And once that principle falls away, any location where the enemy maintains interests — whether military, political, or economic — and to which Iranian military or security forces have access, will be regarded as a legitimate target for the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The time of hit-and-run tactics is long over. A meaningful Persian proverb states: “If you strike a blow, brace for the blow in return.” This proverb is, in essence, another expression of the same Iranian military strategy outlined at the beginning of this piece: The Islamic Republic of Iran will not confine itself to purely defensive measures when it comes to safeguarding its own security.
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